Reasons for China's Frequent Boder Intrusions & Options for Indian Response
China is our neighbor country but our relationship with china is not so good and China is continuouslytrying to intrude in our country's border, presently china has launched a map according to which Andra Pradesh is in their country and their frequent intrusion in our countries border shows their bad will. Guys this post will clear you about India-china relationship from the beginning and also the current relationship status, also the reasons for Frequent Boder Intrusion and therefore the option for India to respond with. This is very important Group Discussion and Lecturette Topic- Frequently asked in SSB INterview.
· Historically, India and China have had cordial relations for more than 2,000 years. The traditional Silk Road not only served as a route for trade, but also promoted the spread of Buddhism from India to China.
· Modern relationship between the two countries began in 1950, when India was amongst the first countries to end formal ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan), and recognize the People’s Republic China as the legitimate government of Mainland China.
Contours of Indo-China Relations
· On August 15, 1947, India became an independent dominion under British Commonwealth and became a federal, democratic republic.
· On October 1, 1949 the People’s Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) of China in a civil war and established the People's Republic of China.
· Mao Zedong, the Commander of the Liberation Army and the Chairman of the Communist Party of China viewed Tibet as an integral part of the Chinese State and was determined to bring Tibet under its direct administrative and military control.
· Tibet serves as a buffer zone between India and China. India regarded the Chinese forceful occupation of Tibet as an act of aggression, while China considered India’s posture on the issue as an interference in the internal affairs of the People’s Republic of China.
· In order to avoid antagonizing the People's Republic of China, India brokered an agreement between Tibet and China, where, Tibetan delegates signed an agreement in May 1951 recognizing PRC sovereignty but guaranteeing that the existing political and social system of Tibet would continue.
· In April 1954, India and the PRC signed an eight-year agreement on Tibet that set forth the basis of their relationship in the form of the Panchsheel or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
· The critics of the Panchsheel Agreement call this as a naïve act of Indian PM Nehru, that, in the absence of credible military wherewithal or a clear policy for defence of the Himalayan region, he saw this as India's best guarantee of security, by way of establishing a psychological buffer zone in place of the lost physical buffer of Tibet.
· Consequently, up until 1959, despite border skirmishes and discrepancies between Indian and Chinese maps, Chinese leaders amicably assured India that there was no territorial controversy on the border and on the other hand India avoided bringing up the border issue in high-level meetings.
· India providing asylum to the Tibetan head, Dalai Lama and thousands of refugees, who sought sanctuary in Dharamsala and in Indian North East states, served as a trigger for the People's Republic of China accusing India of expansionism into Tibet and throughout the Himalayan region. China claimed 104,000 km² of territory over which India's maps showed clear sovereignty, and demanded "rectification" of the entire border.
· China made a proposal to India that it would relinquish its claim to most of India's northeast in exchange for India's abandonment of its claim to Aksai Chin. The Indian Government rejected the idea of a settlement based on uncompensated loss of territory as being humiliating and unequal.
· 1962 Border disputes resulted in a short border war between the People's Republic of China and India on 20 October 1962.
· The border clash resulted in a crushing defeat of India as the PRC pushed the Indian forces to within 48 Kms of the Assam plains in the northeast and also occupied strategic points in Ladakh
· Finally, on 21 November 1962, PRC declared a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew 20 Kms behind its contended line of control.
· In late 1967, there were two skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La incident", and the other the "Chola incident", where exchange of heavy fire took place at the Sikkim outpost.
· During the whole conflict Indian losses were 88 killed and 163 wounded, while Chinese casualties were 300 killed and 450 wounded in Nathu La, and 40 in Chola.
· In 1967, a peasant uprising broke out in Naxalbari, led by pro-Maoist elements. A pronunciation by Mao titled "Spring Thunder over India" gave full moral support for the uprising. However, as the naxalite movement disintegrated, the PRC withdrew its political support and turned non-committal towards the various Indian groups.
· During the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, the Chinese provided them with military and morale support. In fact even now a lot of military hardware held with Pakistan is of Chinese origin.
· In 1980, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved a plan to upgrade the deployment of forces around the Line of Actual Control to avoid unilateral redefinitions of the line. India also increased funds for infrastructural development in these areas.
· In 1984, squads of Indian soldiers began actively patrolling the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh (formerly NEFA), which is north of the McMahon Line as drawn on the Shimla Treaty map
· The Indian team left the area before the winter. In the winter of 1986, the Chinese deployed their troops to the Sumdorong Chu before the Indian team could arrive in the summer and had built a Helipad at Wandu.
· in 1986 and India's grant of statehood to Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North-East Frontier Agency) in February 1987 caused both sides to deploy new troops to the area, raising tensions and fears of a new border war.
· The PRC relayed warnings that it would "teach India a lesson" if it did not cease "nibbling" at Chinese territory.
· By the summer of 1987, however, both sides had backed away from conflict and denied that military clashes had taken place.
· Six rounds of talks of the Indian-Chinese Joint Working Group on the Border Issue were held between December 1988 and June 1993.
· Progress was also made in reducing tensions on the border via confidence-building measures, including mutual troop reductions, regular meetings of local military commanders, and advance notification of military exercises.
· Border trade resumed in July 1992 after a gap of more than thirty years, consulates reopened in Bombay (Mumbai) and Shanghai in December 1992, and, in June 1993, the two sides agreed to open an additional border trading post.
· China eventually recognized Sikkim as an Indian state in 2003, on the condition that India accepted Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of China. This mutual agreement led to greatly improve the Sino-Indian relations.
· The year 2004 was a milestone in Sino-Indian bilateral trade, surpassing the US$10 billion mark for the first time.
· In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Bangalore to push for increased Sino-Indian cooperation in high-tech industries.
· Regarding the issue of India gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, on his visit, Wen Jiabao initially seemed to support the idea, but had returned to a neutral position on the subject by the time he returned to China.
· In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit (2005) China was granted an observer status.
· In Jan 2006 during an agreement was signed which envisages ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) placing joint bids for promising projects elsewhere.
· On July 6, 2006, China and India, after 44 years, re-opened Nathula, an ancient trade route which was part of the Silk Road and had been closed since the Sino-Indian War broke out in 1962.
· In November 2006, China and India had a verbal spat over claim of the north-east Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. India claimed that China was occupying 38,000 square Kms of its territory in Kashmir, while China claimed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its own.
· In May 2007, China denied the application for visa from an IAS officer in Arunachal Pradesh. According to China, since Arunachal Pradesh is a territory of China, he would not need a visa to visit his own country.
· In January 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China and met with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and had bilateral discussions related to trade, commerce, defence, military, and various other issues.
· In October 2009, Asian Development Bank formally acknowledging Arunachal Pradesh as part of India approved a loan to India for a development project there. Earlier China had exercised pressure on the bank to cease the loan.
· In April 2011, during the BRICS summit in China, the two countries agreed to restore defence co-operation and China had hinted that it may reverse its policy of administering stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir.
· Bilateral trade between the two countries reached US$73 billion in 2011, making China India's largest trade partner, but slipped to US$66 billion in 2012. It is expected that trade between these two Asian economic powers will reach US$100 billion by 2015.
· A three-week standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in close proximity to each other and the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh region and Aksai Chin was defused on 5 May 2013.
· The Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops in exchange for an Indian agreement to demolish several "live-in bunkers" 250 km to the south in the disputed Chumar sector.
· Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made his first foreign visit to India on 18 May 2013 in a bid to resolve border disputes and to stimulate economic relations.
· There have also been speculations on Indian side on how to tackle the rising trade deficit with China which currently stands up at $40 Billion.
Reasons for Border Incursions by China
· China does not accept the Mc Mohan line as the legal delineation between India and China. It says that this was a demarcation agreed upon between erstwhile British Raj and Tibet.
· There is no clear demarcation of the boundaries, thereby leading to errors of perception and understanding of previous agreements.
· Incursions from China continue despite protests and meetings by India. The intrusions are well coordinated and show marked interest by the PLA in areas of military significance.
· China has highly developed surface and air communication facilities all along the Tibetian Autonomous Region (TAR), especially, opposite Arunachal Pradesh and is in the process of preparing a dozen more airfields in Tibet.
· Indian side on the other hand, is highly under developed with difficult terrain and therefore, builds up, movement and reinforcement of troops will be laborious and time consuming.
· Assertive stance of China on the border is an indicator that it wants to stake its territorial claims and also dissuade India from building up infrastructure along the border.
· Also, by slowly biting into pieces of Indian Territory through continuous intrusions, the Chinese are observing how India’s political leadership and its security forces react to such provocation.
· The PLA is training for short and swift conflict preceded by a cyber-offensive. An offensive could involve the use of missiles, anti-satellite weapons, overwhelming firepower and control over the air space. The extent and scale of conflict would depend on Chinese motives and intent.
· China’s larger strategy is to isolate India and keep it confined to the back waters of South Asia through its policy of establishing a‘string of pearls’ by increasing its influence over all neighbours of India, like, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan and of course with its all-time ally Pakistan.
What Should be India’s Stance Against Chinese Provocation
· It is only through a strong show of force and defence preparedness that the integrity of our borders can be maintained. Hence, India has to move from a policy of dissuasion to that of credible deterrence.
· Let us Compare India vs China Military Power:
a. Active Military Troops 13.25 22.55 lakh
b. Air Force 3,000 Aircrafts & 9,000 Aircrafts &
790 Fighter Planes 2000 Fighter Planes
a. Navy Fleet of 145 Vessels Fleet of 284 Vessels
b. Strategic Nuclear Def 200-400 Nuclear 50-70 Nuclear Warheads
· The above comparison reveals that the military might of China is nearly two to three times to that of India. So the question arises how do we adopt the policy of credible deterrence?
· Diplomatically, India must proactively resolve all issues and differences with Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bhutan. The invitation to all SAARC members by our new PM during his swearing in ceremony was a step in this direction.
· We need to actively pursue our ‘Look East Policy’, by engaging all SE Asian nations, who have clashing interests with China in the South China Sea.
· Similarly, engaging a heavy weight like Japan in trade and diplomatic ties will serve as a counter weight against China expansionism. Specially, when Japan- China relations are at its worst because of the dispute over the control of Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea. Our PM’s visit to Japan is at this juncture is a diplomatic masterstroke.
· Indian economy needs to be export driven rather than import drive to be able to offset the trade deficit with China.
· Besides the above actions, militarily, India needs to improve its force level along the LAC and NE border with China; a new Mountain Corps is being raised to meet this explicit requirement.
· At the tactical level, there must be a renewed emphasis laid on patrolling and surveillance using satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and battle field surveillance radars. So as to appear more assertive and forceful in projecting its footprints.
· Deployment of strategic assets, keeping the threat perception in mind, will serve as a serious deterrent and ‘a threat in being’. Agni V must be operasionalised earliest for deployment with strategic forces.
· Last but not the least, considering that China is our largest trading partner, we must continuously engage China into meaningful talks and sincerely endeavor to resolve the long outstanding border disputes amicably.