Reasons for China’s Frequent Boder Intrusions &Options for Indian Response
India-China RelationshipsChina is our neighbor country but our relationship with china is not so good and China is continuouslytrying to intrude in our country’s border, presently china has launched a map according to which Andra Pradesh is in their country and their frequent intrusion in our countries border shows their bad will. Guys this post will clear you about India-china relationship from the beginning and also the current relationship status, also the reasons for Frequent Boder Intrusion and therefore the option for India to respond with. This is very important Group Discussion and Lecturette Topic– Frequently asked in SSB INterview.
· Historically, Indiaand China have had cordial relations for more than 2,000 years. The traditionalSilk Road not only served as a route for trade, but also promoted the spread ofBuddhism from India to China.
· Modern relationshipbetween the two countries began in 1950, when India was amongst the firstcountries to end formal ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan), andrecognize the People’s Republic China as the legitimategovernment of Mainland China.
Contours of Indo-China Relations
· On August 15, 1947,India became an independent dominion under British Commonwealth and became afederal, democratic republic.
· On October 1, 1949 thePeople’s Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) of Chinain a civil war and established the People’s Republic of China.
· Mao Zedong, theCommander of the Liberation Army and the Chairman of the Communist Party ofChina viewed Tibet as an integral part of the Chinese State and was determinedto bring Tibet under its direct administrative and military control.
· Tibet serves as abuffer zone between India and China. India regarded the Chinese forcefuloccupation of Tibet as an act of aggression, while China considered India’sposture on the issue as an interference in the internal affairs of the People’sRepublic of China.
· In order to avoidantagonizing the People’s Republic of China, India brokered an agreementbetween Tibet and China, where, Tibetan delegates signed an agreement in May1951 recognizing PRC sovereignty but guaranteeing that the existing politicaland social system of Tibet would continue.
· In April 1954, Indiaand the PRC signed an eight-year agreement on Tibet that set forth the basis oftheir relationship in the form of the Panchsheel or the Five Principles ofPeaceful Coexistence.
· The critics of thePanchsheel Agreement call this as a naïve act of Indian PM Nehru, that, in theabsence of credible military wherewithal or a clear policy for defence of theHimalayan region, he saw this as India’s best guarantee of security, by way ofestablishing a psychological buffer zone in place of the lost physical bufferof Tibet.
· Consequently, up until1959, despite border skirmishes and discrepancies between Indian and Chinesemaps, Chinese leaders amicably assured India that there was no territorialcontroversy on the border and on the other hand India avoided bringing up theborder issue in high-level meetings.
· India providing asylumto the Tibetan head, Dalai Lama and thousands of refugees, who sought sanctuaryin Dharamsala and in Indian North East states, served as a trigger for thePeople’s Republic of China accusing India of expansionism into Tibet andthroughout the Himalayan region. China claimed 104,000 km² of territoryover which India’s maps showed clear sovereignty, and demanded”rectification” of the entire border.
· China made a proposalto India that it would relinquish its claim to most of India’s northeast inexchange for India’s abandonment of its claim to Aksai Chin. The IndianGovernment rejected the idea of a settlement based on uncompensated loss ofterritory as being humiliating and unequal.
· 1962 Border disputesresulted in a short border war between the People’s Republic of China and Indiaon 20 October 1962.
· The border clashresulted in a crushing defeat of India as the PRC pushed the Indian forces towithin 48 Kms of the Assam plains in the northeast and also occupied strategicpoints in Ladakh
· Finally, on 21November 1962, PRC declared a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew 20 Kms behindits contended line of control.
· In late 1967, there were two skirmishes between Indian andChinese forces in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the “Nathu Laincident”, and the other the “Chola incident”, where exchange ofheavy fire took place at the Sikkim outpost.
· During the whole conflict Indian losses were 88 killed and 163wounded, while Chinese casualties were 300 killed and 450 wounded in Nathu La,and 40 in Chola.
· In 1967, a peasant uprising broke out in Naxalbari, led bypro-Maoist elements. A pronunciation by Mao titled “Spring Thunder overIndia” gave full moral support for the uprising. However, as the naxalitemovement disintegrated, the PRC withdrew its political support and turned non-committaltowards the various Indian groups.
· During the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, the Chinese providedthem with military and morale support. In fact even now a lot of militaryhardware held with Pakistan is of Chinese origin.
· In 1980, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved a plan toupgrade the deployment of forces around the Line of Actual Control to avoidunilateral redefinitions of the line. India also increased funds forinfrastructural development in these areas.
· In 1984, squads of Indian soldiers began actively patrolling theSumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh (formerly NEFA), which is north ofthe McMahon Line as drawn on the Shimla Treaty map
· The Indian team left the area before the winter. In the winterof 1986, the Chinese deployed their troops to the Sumdorong Chu before theIndian team could arrive in the summer and had built a Helipad at Wandu.
· in 1986 and India’s grant of statehood to Arunachal Pradesh(formerly the North-East Frontier Agency) in February 1987 caused both sides todeploy new troops to the area, raising tensions and fears of a new border war.
· The PRC relayed warnings that it would “teach India alesson” if it did not cease “nibbling” at Chinese territory.
· By the summer of 1987, however, both sides had backed away fromconflict and denied that military clashes had taken place.
· Six rounds of talks ofthe Indian-Chinese Joint Working Group on the Border Issue were held betweenDecember 1988 and June 1993.
· Progress was also madein reducing tensions on the border via confidence-building measures, includingmutual troop reductions, regular meetings of local military commanders, andadvance notification of military exercises.
· Border trade resumedin July 1992 after a gap of more than thirty years, consulates reopened inBombay (Mumbai) and Shanghai in December 1992, and, in June 1993, the two sidesagreed to open an additional border trading post.
· China eventuallyrecognized Sikkim as an Indian state in 2003, on the condition that Indiaaccepted Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of China. This mutual agreement ledto greatly improve the Sino-Indian relations.
· The year 2004 was a milestone in Sino-Indian bilateral trade,surpassing the US$10 billion mark for the first time.
· In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Bangalore to pushfor increased Sino-Indian cooperation in high-tech industries.
· Regarding the issue of India gaining a permanent seat on the UNSecurity Council, on his visit, Wen Jiabao initially seemed to support theidea, but had returned to a neutral position on the subject by the time hereturned to China.
· In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)Summit (2005) China was granted an observer status.
· In Jan 2006 during an agreement was signed which envisages ONGCVidesh Ltd (OVL) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) placingjoint bids for promising projects elsewhere.
· On July 6, 2006, China and India, after 44 years, re-openedNathula, an ancient trade route which was part of the Silk Road and had beenclosed since the Sino-Indian War broke out in 1962.
· In November 2006, China and India had a verbal spat over claimof the north-east Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. India claimed that Chinawas occupying 38,000 square Kms of its territory in Kashmir, while Chinaclaimed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its own.
· In May 2007, China denied the application for visa from an IASofficer in Arunachal Pradesh. According to China, since Arunachal Pradesh is aterritory of China, he would not need a visa to visit his own country.
· In January 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China andmet with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and had bilateraldiscussions related to trade, commerce, defence, military, and various otherissues.
· In October 2009, Asian Development Bank formally acknowledgingArunachal Pradesh as part of India approved a loan to India for a developmentproject there. Earlier China had exercised pressure on the bank to cease theloan.
· In April 2011, during the BRICS summit in China, the twocountries agreed to restore defence co-operation and China had hinted that itmay reverse its policy of administering stapled visas to residents of Jammu andKashmir.
· Bilateral trade between the two countries reached US$73 billionin 2011, making China India’s largest trade partner, but slipped to US$66billion in 2012. It is expected that trade between these two Asian economicpowers will reach US$100 billion by 2015.
· A three-week standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in closeproximity to each other and the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh region andAksai Chin was defused on 5 May 2013.
· The Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops in exchange for anIndian agreement to demolish several “live-in bunkers” 250 km tothe south in the disputed Chumar sector.
· Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made his first foreign visit to Indiaon 18 May 2013 in a bid to resolve border disputes and to stimulate economicrelations.
· There have also been speculations on Indian side on how totackle the rising trade deficit with China which currently stands up at $40Billion.
Reasons for Border Incursions by China
· China does not acceptthe Mc Mohan line as the legal delineation between India and China. It saysthat this was a demarcation agreed upon between erstwhile British Raj andTibet.
· There is no cleardemarcation of the boundaries, thereby leading to errors of perception andunderstanding of previous agreements.
· Incursions from Chinacontinue despite protests and meetings by India. The intrusions are wellcoordinated and show marked interest by the PLA in areas of militarysignificance.
· China has highlydeveloped surface and air communication facilities all along the TibetianAutonomous Region (TAR), especially, opposite Arunachal Pradesh and is in theprocess of preparing a dozen more airfields in Tibet.
· Indian side on theother hand, is highly under developed with difficult terrain and therefore,builds up, movement and reinforcement of troops will be laborious and timeconsuming.
· Assertive stance ofChina on the border is an indicator that it wants to stake its territorialclaims and also dissuade India from building up infrastructure along theborder.
· Also, by slowly bitinginto pieces of Indian Territory through continuous intrusions, the Chinese areobserving how India’s political leadership and its security forces react tosuch provocation.
· The PLA is trainingfor short and swift conflict preceded by a cyber-offensive. An offensive couldinvolve the use of missiles, anti-satellite weapons, overwhelming firepower andcontrol over the air space. The extent and scale of conflict would depend onChinese motives and intent.
· China’s largerstrategy is to isolate India and keep it confined to the back waters of SouthAsia through its policy of establishing a‘string of pearls’ byincreasing its influence over all neighbours of India, like, Nepal, Sri Lanka,Myanmar, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan and of course with its all-time allyPakistan.
What Should be India’s Stance Against ChineseProvocation
· It is only through astrong show of force and defence preparedness that the integrity of our borderscan be maintained. Hence, India has to move from a policy of dissuasion tothat of credible deterrence.
· Letus Compare India vs China Military Power:
a. ActiveMilitary Troops 13.25 22.55 lakh
b. AirForce 3,000 Aircrafts& 9,000Aircrafts &
790 FighterPlanes 2000 Fighter Planes
a. Navy Fleet of 145 Vessels Fleetof 284 Vessels
b. StrategicNuclear Def 200-400Nuclear 50-70 Nuclear Warheads
· The above comparison reveals that the military might of China isnearly two to three times to that of India. So the question arises how do weadopt the policy of credible deterrence?
· Diplomatically, India must proactively resolve all issues anddifferences with Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bhutan. Theinvitation to all SAARC members by our new PM during his swearing in ceremonywas a step in this direction.
· We need to actively pursue our ‘Look East Policy’, by engagingall SE Asian nations, who have clashing interests with China in the South ChinaSea.
· Similarly, engaging a heavy weight like Japan in trade anddiplomatic ties will serve as a counter weight against China expansionism.Specially, when Japan- China relations are at its worst because of the disputeover the control of Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea. Our PM’svisit to Japan is at this juncture is a diplomatic masterstroke.
· Indian economy needs to be export driven rather than importdrive to be able to offset the trade deficit with China.
· Besides the above actions, militarily, India needs to improveits force level along the LAC and NE border with China; a new Mountain Corps isbeing raised to meet this explicit requirement.
· At the tactical level, there must be a renewed emphasis laid onpatrolling and surveillance using satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)and battle field surveillance radars. So as to appear more assertive andforceful in projecting its footprints.
· Deployment of strategic assets, keeping the threat perception inmind, will serve as a serious deterrent and ‘a threat in being’. Agni V must beoperasionalised earliest for deployment with strategic forces.
· Last but not the least, considering that China is our largesttrading partner, we must continuously engage China into meaningful talks andsincerely endeavor to resolve the long outstanding border disputes amicably.
Contributor to this Post:
Facilitator and Trainer. He specialises in memory management, EQ and SQ. Has a vast experience in group skills development. , Ex Member Services Selection Board. (Trained at Defence Institute of Psychological Research, DRDO in Psychology with special focus on Competency based Evaluation through Group Dynamics) Held numerous training and motivational programmes on Leadership and Team Building for over 22 years. He is an expert in memory management.
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I’m Deepak Tomar. I have completed my M.Tech in Computer Science and now i am working as a Govt. Employee in UP Police, I Love to help others and making friends, you can connect to me on facebook for any help- I will be happy to help you .